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ARE TITLE VI'S DISPARATE IMPACT
REGULATIONS VALID?

Bradford C. Mank·
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress passed its first piece of comprehensive civil rights legislation
in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Under Title VI of that Act, federal
agencies may not provide funding to "recipient" programs that
discriminate on the basis of race. I The statutory language of Title VI is
ambiguous about whether recipients are prohibited only from engaging
in intentional discrimination, or whether recipients may behave in ways
that cause unintentional, disparate impacts. 2 Section 601 of Title VI
states that "[n]o person shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.,,3 It is unclear whether the term "discrimination" refers to intentional or unintentional discrimination. 4 The
statute's legislative history contains statements supporting both interpretations. 5 While its Title VI cases are complex and not easy to summarize, the Supreme Court has interpreted section 601 of the statute to
forbid intentional discrimination by programs or activities receiving
federal financial assistance. 6

• JamesB. Helmer,Jr. Professol'OfLaw, University of Cincinnati College of Law. I thank Michael
Solimine for his perceptive comments. I thank Too Thompson for his research assistance. All errors 01'
omissions are my responsibility. 513-556-0094; brad.mank@uc.edu.
I. Section 60 I of the statute provides that" [n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied thbenefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U .S.C. § 2000d (2000); see Bradford C. Mank, Tille VI, in THE LAw OF ENVIRONMENTALJUSTICE
23,23-25 (Michael Gerrard ed., 1999) Lhereinafter Mank,TIlIe Vl); Bradford C. Mank,Is 7Mre a PriwJ,e Cause
rifAction Uruler EPA's Tille VI RtgulJJJinns?, 24 CoLUM.J. ENVrL. L. I, 12 (1999) [hereinafter Mank,Jnvate
Cause rifAction]; James H. Colopy, Note, The Road Less Trm~led: Pursuing EnuironmentalJustice Through Title VI
rifthe Ciztil Rights Act rif 196-1, 13 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 125, 152-55 (1994). Thetypical intermediary recipient
is a state 01' local agency that receives federal funding and then distributes the proceeds to individual
beneficiaries. Id. at 154. The ultimate individual beneficiaries are exempt from Title VI./d.
2. See Charles F. Abernathy, Tille VI and the Constitution: A RtguiabJry Motlelfor IAjining "Discrimination,"
70 GEO. LJ. I, 21-23, 25·27 (1981) (arguing definition of "discrimination" in Title VI is unclear); Michael
Mello, IAfonding 1Aath, 32 AM. CRIM. 1.. REV. 933, 959 (1995) (same).
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
4. See Abernathy, supra note 2, at 21-23, 25-27; Mello,supra note 2, at 959.
5. See Abernathy, supra note 2, at 21-23, 25-27; Mello,suprn note 2, at 959.
6. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275; 280-82(2001); Mank,TIlIe VI, suprn note I, at 23-25.
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That interpretation, however, is not the end of the story. Additionally, section 602 of Tide VI requires federal funding agencies to adopt
and enforce regulations that prohibit recipients from engaging in
discrimination and requires those regulations to be approved by the
President. 7 In 1964, a presidential task force developed standard Tide
VI regulations prohibiting recipients from using "criteria or methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination."s Since 1964, every federal agency has followed these model
regulations to prohibit recipients from engaging in practices having
discriminatory impacts. 9 Because section 602 disparate impact
regulations "forbid conduct that § 601 permits" there has been contro-

. 7. § 2000d-1 of Title VI states in palt:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial
assistance to any pl'Ogram 01' activity, by way of grant, loan, 01' contract other than a contract
of insurance 01' guaranty, is authOl;zed and directed to effectuate the provisions of section
2000d of this title with respect to such program 01' activity by issuing I'Ules, regulations, 01'
ordel'liofgeneral applicability which shall be consistent with the achievement of the objectives
of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
No such I'Ule, regulation, 01' order shall become effective unless and until approved by the
President.
42 U.S,C. § 2000d-l; Mank, Tille VI, supra note I, at 25; Mank,ltivate Cause <ifAction, supra note I, at 12.
To facilitate the enforcement of the \'lII;oUS § 602 regulations issued by various agencies, the Department of
Justice has issued regulations conceming the implementation of Title VI requirements, including a
requirement that agencies adopt procedures for monitOl;ng a recipient's pre- and post-award compliance.
See 28 C.F.R. § 42.405 (2000) (Department ofJustice Regulations); 40 C.F.R. § 7.110-.115 (2000) (EPA
regulations); Michael Fisher,Em>ironmentalRacism Claims Brought Under Tille VI <if1M Civil RightsAc/25 ENVTL.
L. 285,313 (1995); Mello,supra note 2, at 961 n.143. Ifit finds a recipient has engaged in discl;minatory
actions, an agency may refuse to award or continue assistance, 01' refer the matter to the Department of
Justice for pl'Osecution. See 40 C.F.R. § 7.130 (1994) (EPA regulations); Colopy,rupra note I, at 176-80;
Fishel', supra note 2, at 313. However, if a recipient is found to have engaged in discriminatory practices,
federal agencies almost always reach a settlement with a recipient to prevent such conduct in the future, but
continue to provide funding. See Mank, ltivate Cause <ifAction, supra note I, at 13; Mank, Tule VI, supra note
I, at 25.
8. 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964) (emphasis added); see GuardiansAss'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,463
U.S. 582, 618 (1983) (MaI'lihall,J.) (quoting 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964)); Mank(tU'ate Cause <ifAction, supra
note I, at 13; Mank, Tille VI, supra note I, at 25; Sidney D. Watson,Reirwigorating Tule VI: Defending Health
CareDiscrimination-It Slwuldn't Be So Ea.!y, 58 FoRDHAML. REv. 939, 947-48 (1990) (noting presidential task
force in 1964 assisted federal agencies promulgate comparable disparate impact regulations under Title VI);
Commen~ Tille VI <if1M Civil Rights Act <if J964-Implementation and Impaq 36 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 846
(1968). The task force included representatives from the White House, Depaltment ofJustice, the Civil
Rights Commission, and Bureau of the Budget.ld. at 846 n~ 19.
9. Guartliam, 463 U.S. at 618 (1983) (Mal'lihall,J.) (recipients may not use '''clitel;a 01' methods of
administration which have the effect of subjecting individuals. to discrimination"'(quoting 45 C.F.R. §
80.3(b)(2) (1964)); ill. at 592 n.13 (White,].) (obselving "every Cabinet department and about 40 agencies
adopted Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate-impact discrimination.")~ee Mank, ltivate Cause <ifAction,
supra note I, at 13; Mank,1itle VI, supra note I, at 25; Paul K. Sonn, Note,FighlingMinot#y Underrepresentation
in PubliclY Funtkd Construction Projects 4fierCroson: A Tille VI LiJigation Strakgy, 10 I YALE LJ. 1577, 1581 n.25
(1992) QistingTitie VI regulations for several federal agencies); Watson, supra note 8, at 947-48.
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versy about whether such regulations are valid.1O Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has indicated in several cases, at least in dicta, and
arguably in language deserving precedential value, that agencies may
promulgate regulations, pursuant to section 602 of Title VI, that
prohibit practices creating unjustified discriminatory effects. II
There are signs, however, that the Supreme Court may soon reject
section 602 disparate impact regulations. In 200 I, the Supreme Court
in Alexander v. Sandoval held in a five-to-four decision that there is no
private right of action to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI. 12 The majority concluded that
neither section 602's language nor subsequent amendments to Title VI
demonstrated congressional intent to establish a private cause of action
to enforce section 602.13 Accordingly, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, held that" [n] either as originally enacted nor as later amended
does Title VI display an intent to create a freestanding private right of
action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore
hold that no such right of action exists.,,14
While Sandoval only addressed whether there is a private cause of
action to enforce disparate impact regulations and assumed that federal
agencies may issue disparate impact regulations because no party in the
case had challenged the validity of the regulations, 15 Justice Scalia, in
dicta, questioned whether disparate impact regulations under Title VI
are consistent with the Supreme Court's determination that section 60 I
of the statute only prohibits intentional discrimination. 16 He stated, "We
cannot help observing, however, how strange it is to say that disparateimpact regulations are 'inspired by, at the service of, and inseparably
intertwined with' § 60 I ... when § 60 I permits the very behavior that
the regulations forbid." 17 Justice Scalia conceded that prior decisions of
the Court had suggested that section 602's disparate impact regulations

u.s.

10. Sandova4 532
at 276, 285.
II. See infta notes 51-52, 62-82 and accompanying text.
12. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
13. /d. at 288-9J.
14. /d. at 293.
15. See it!. at282.
16. Justice Scalia stated: .
[W]e must assume for purposes ofdeciding this case that regulations promulgated under § 602
of Title VI may validly proscribe activities that have a disparate impact on racial groups, even
though such activities are permissible under § 60 I. Though no opinion of this Court has held
• that, five Justices in Guardians voiced that view of the law at least as alternative grounds for
their decisions ... These statements are in considerable tension with the rule of Bakke and
Guardians that § 60 I forbids only intentional discrimination ... but petitioners have not
challenged the regulations here.
/d. at 281-82.
17. See Uf. at 286 n.6 (quoting Stevens,j.,joined by Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer,jJ., dissenting).
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are valid. He stated that "[t] hough no opinion of this Court has held
that, five] ustices in Guardians voiced that view of the law at least as
alternative grounds for their decisions,"18 and that "dictum in Alexander
v. Choate is to the same effect."19 Despite this precedent,]ustice Scalia
argued that Guardians' and Alexander's approval of disparate impact
regulations in section 602 of Tide VI was "in considerable tension with
the rule of Bakke and Guardians that § 601 forbids only intentional
discrimination. ,,20 Many knowledgeable environmental leaders in
industry, government, and the environmental justice movement itself
believe that] ustice Scalia's dicta in Sandoval is a clear sign that the Court
will soon reject the section 602 disparate impact regulations in Tide
VI. 2 I
This Essay, however, contends that section 602 disparate impact
regulations in Tide VI are valid because Congress has implicidy
sanctioned their creation, and explicidy approved them in subsequent
related statutes. Part II of this Essay discusses the legislative history of
Tide VI, which suggests that Congress intended to give administrative
agencies discretion to define "discrimination" in their Tide VI regulations as prohibiting either intentional conduct or actions having
disparate impacts against racial minorities as long as the President
approved such rules. 22 Part III illustrates that five different Congresses
have enacted four subsequent related statutes that explicidy incorporate
Tide VI disparate impact regulations as a model. 23 In Food & Drug
Administration v. Brown & Wiliiamson,24 a majority of the Supreme Court,
including]ustice Scalia, used subsequent related statutes as a guide to
interpret the authority of the Food and Drug Administration to regulate
tobacco products. 25 Similarly, the enactment of subsequent related
statutes that explicidy incorporate Tide VI's disparate impact regulations as a model provide strong evidence that the Court should interpret
Tide VI to authorize those regulations. This Essay concludes that,
together, the evidence in Tide VI's legislative history and subsequent

18. See id. at 281-82 (citing Guardians Ass'n. v. Civil SCIV. Com'n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582,
591-92 (1983) (opinion of White,].)); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 623, n. 15 (Marshall,]., dissenting)#. at 64345 (Stevens,]., joined by Brennan and Blackmun,lJ., dissenting)).
19. /d. al282 (citingAk~ander, 469 U.S. at 293, 295, n.II).
20. /d. (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. at 612-13 (O'Connor,]., concurring in judgment)).
21. See Activists' Appeal to High Court Mrry Spell Endfor EPA Equiry RuLe, ENVTL. PoL'y ALERT, May I,
2002, at 40-41 (reporting "[i]ndustry officials, EPA sources and environmental justice attorneys all say the
COutt likely will overturn EPA's bar on unintentional discrimination under Title VI").
22. See Abernathy, supra note 2, at 3, 28-32, 48-49,passim; see also Mello, supra note 2, at 959-60
(discussing Professor Abernathy's interpretation of Title VI's legislative history).
23. See infta notes III-IS and accompanying text.
24. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
25. See infta notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
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related statutes supports the validity of Title VI disparate impact
regulations despite the fact that the Supreme Court has limited section
601 to intentional discrimination.

II. TITLE VI AND THE SUPREME COURT: INTENTIONAL OR
UNINTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION?

A. Lau v. Nichols

During 1974, in Lau v. Nichols,26 the Supreme Court concluded that
Title VI prohibited disparate impact discrimination by a school district
that failed to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese
ancestry. Justice Douglas's majority opinion apparently interpreted
section 601 to preclude disparate impact discrimination. The Lau Court
stated that it "rel[ied] solely on § 601" to reverse the Court of Appeals. 27
The Court assumed that the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare's (HEW) section 602 regulations were consistent with section
601. In Lau, the Title VI regulations at issue forbade funding recipients
to take actions that had the effect of discriminating on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. 28 Summarizing the HEW regulations, the
Court concluded that the regulation forbade disparate impact discrimination because "[d]iscrimination is barred which has that effect even
though no purposeful design is present. ,,29 The Court stated that the
section 602 disparate impact regulations simply " [made] sure that
recipients offederal aid ... conduct[ed] any federally financed projects
consistently with § 601."30 Accordingly , Justice Douglas's majority
opinion in Lau indicated that both sections 601 and 602 prohibited
disparate impact discrimination.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stewart, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun, questioned whether section 601 itself
barred unintentional discrimination. He contended that "it [was] not
entirely clear" that section 601 "standing alone, would render illegal the
expenditure of federal funds on these schools.,,31 Nevertheless, he

26. See Lau \ .. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
27. /d. at 566.
28. The regulations stated thata recipient may not "utilize critetia or methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting indh·iduals to disctimination" or have "the effect of defeating or substantially
impaitingaccomplishment of the objectives of the program as respect indi\·iduals of a patticular race, color,
or national origin." 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1977);Lau, 414 U.S. at 568.
29. Lau, 414 U.S. at 568, 570 (citing 35 Fed. Reg. 11595 (1970)).
30. /d. at 567.
31. Id. at 570 (Stewatt,]., concurring in result).
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concluded that the agency could prohibit disparate impact discrimination based 011 its section 602 regulations because those regulations were
"reasonably related" to the goals of the statute. 32

B. Regents qf California v. Bakke
During 1978, in Regents qfCalifornia v. Bakke,33 the Supreme Court
apparendy rejected Lau's "effects standard." In Bakke, the Court
reviewed a decision of the California Supreme Court that had enjoined
the University of California Medical School from "according any
consideration to race in its admissions process. ,,34 The Court suggested
that proof of intentional discrimination was necessary to establish a
3j
violation of the various civil rights statutes,including Tide VI. In his
concurring opinion that provided the decisive fifth vote in the case and
announced the judgment of the Court,Justice Powell stated that section
60 I "proscribe [s] only those racial classifications that would violate the
Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.,,36 Justice Brennan's
plurality opinion, which was joined by Justices White, Marshall, and
Blackmun appeared to agree that Tide VI only prohibits behavior
proscribed by the Constituti0I1;'s Equal Protection Clause. 37 He stated
that the legislative history of Tide VI "reveals one fixed purpose: to give
the Executive Branch of Government clear authority to terminate
federal funding of private programs that use race as a means of
disadvantaging minorities in a manner that would be prohibited by the
Constitution if engaged in by government.,,38 Justice Brennan also
stated that "as applied to the case before us, Tide VI goes no further in
prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause.,,39
The Bakke decision did not expressly overrule Lau, however, and did
not necessarily reject Tide VI regulations prohibiting disparate impact
discrimination. 4o Justice Powell rejected the petitioner's argument that
Lau prohibited affirmative action for racial or ethnic minorities because

32. ]d. at 570·71 (Stewart,]., concurring in I~sult) (quoting Mourning \'. Family Publ'n Ser\·s., Inc.,
411 U.S. 356, 369 (quoting Thorpe y. Hous. Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81));>ee alw Alexander
v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,285 n.5 (200 I) (discussing majOlity and concul'I'ing opinions in Lau); Abernathy,
supm nme 2, at 4 I.
33. See 438 U.S. 265, 318-19 (1978) (powcll); Colopy,rupra note I, at 158.
34. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 272
35. Seeid. at 318·19.
36. ]d. at 287 (powell,].).
37. See id. at 325, 328, 352 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,JJ.).
38. Id. at 329 (plumlity opinion of Brcnnan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,lJ.).
39. ]d. at 325.
40. See Mello, supra note 2, at 963·64.
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the Lau "decision rested solely on the statute" as interpreted by the
HEW to prohibit discriminatory effects and the "preference" at issue in
the earlier decision had not denied any relevant benefit to anyone else. 4l
By contrast, the parties in Bakke had not addressed the applicability of
Title VI, but "focused exclusively upon the validity of the special
admissions program under the Equal Protection Clause.,,42 justice
Powell never suggested that Lau was no longer good law despite his view
that Title VI "proscribed only those racial classifications that would
violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.,,43 He
never addressed the validity of Title VI's regulations. 44
While stating that Title VI is coextensive with the Constitution and
stating that he had "serious doubts" about Lau's reasoning,45 justice
Brennan's opinion also cited Lau for the principle that section 602
regulations "are entitled to considerable deference in construing Title
VI.,,46 His opinion favorably observed that the HEW's Title VI
regulations "requit[ed)" affirmative measures to help minorities who
had been subject to discrimination and "authoriz[ed]" voluntary
affirmative action programs by federally funded institutions that had not
been guilty of prior discrimination. 47 While his reasoning might appear
to be inconsistent,48 justice Brennan's underlying purpose in arguing
that Title VI was limited to the Constitution was to reject the view that
the statute prohibited affirmative action that was allowed under the
Constitution. 49 Accordingly,justice Brennan's opinion in Bakke did not
preclude Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate impacts, although
there are arguably inconsistencies in his opinion's limitation of Title VI
to the Constitution and approval of HEW's disparate impact regulations."o

C. Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission
In 1983, in Guardians Ass''; v. Civil Service Commission,5l a deeply divided
Supreme Court issued a complex multi-faceted opinion that held that

u.s.

41. 1Jakk, 438
at 304 (opinion orpowcll,].).
42. /d. at 281 (powell,].); Mello,supm note 2, at 963.
43. Bakk, 438 U.S. at 287, 304 (powell,].); Mello,supranote 2, at 963 n.153.
44. See Abernathy, supra note 2, at 40 n.277.
45. See id. at 325, 328, 352 (Bn:nnan, White, Mal"Shall, and Blackmun,.IT.).
46. See id. :it 342·43 (Brennan, White, Mat"Shall, and Blackmun,.IT.).
47. See id. at 343 (Brennan, White, Mal"Shall, and Blackmun,.IT.).
48. See Abernathy, supra note 2, at 41 n,280.
49. Mello, supra note 2, at 963·64.
50. /d.
51. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
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proof ofintentional discrimination is required under section 601 ofTitle
VI, but also indicated that agencies implementing regulations under
section 602 may prohibit disparate impact discrimination. 52 The
Guardians decision was complicated in part because it involved two
related questions: first, the substantive standard for proving "discrimination" under Title VI, and, second, the remedies available to private
plaintiffs who meet the standard under the statute. 53 In Guardians, black
and Hispanic members of the New York City Police Department fIled
suit alleging that several written examinations used by the Department
to make initial hiring decisions and to decide layoffs among officers with
equal seniority had a discriminatory impact on minority candidates and
officers. j4 Based on the Department of Labor's Title VI regulations,
which prohibited recipients from engaging in actions having racially
disparate impacts,jj the district court for the Southern District of New
York concluded that the plaintiffs' evidence of discriminatory impact
from the tests was sufficient to prove a violation ofTitle VI and awarded
the plaintiffs compensatory relief.j6 The Second Circuit reversed the
district court's decision, however, holding that Title VI required proof
of discriminatory intent and, therefore, that courts could not award
compensatory relief for recipient actions causing disparate impacts. 57
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit by holding that
compensatory relief was available to a private plaintiff from federal
courts only if a plaintiff proved intentional discrimination, but five
justices indicated that declaratory and injunctive relief were potential
remedies against a recipient whose actions caused disparate impacts. 58
In Guardians, seven members of the Supreme Court agreed that proof
of discriminatory intent is required by the statute in section 601.59
Justices White and Marshall each argued in separate concurring and
dissenting opinions that section 601's definition of "discrimination"
52. Id.at584n.2; Mank,Primle CauseqfAction, supra note l,at 13-15.
53. Mello, supra note 2, at 965.
54. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; Mank,Primle Cause qfAction, supra note 1, at 14.
55. See 29 C.F.R. § 31.3(c)(I).
56. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; Guardians ,·.Civil Selv. Comm'n, 466 F. Supp. 1273, 1285-87
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Mank,Prillllle Cause qfAction, supra note 1, at 14.
57. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 582; Guardians v. Civil Servo Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232., 270 (2d Cir.
1980) (KelieherJ., concurring); id. at 274 (Com·in,]., concurring); Mank,Pril1ale Cause qfAction, supra note
1, at 14.
58. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 607 (opinion of White,].) (only dcdamtory and injunctive relief
appropriate); id. at 644-45 (Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun, jJ., dissenting); iti. at 624 (Marshall,].,
dissenting) (would allow full compensation); Mello,rupra note 2, at 965.
59. See Alexander\". Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 610-11 (powell,].,
concurring in judgment, joined by Burger, CJ. & Rehnquist,].); id. at 612, 615 (O'Connor,]., concurring
injudgment); id. at 642-45 (Ste,·ens, dissenting, joined by Brennan & Blackmun,lJ.); Mank/hllale Cause '!I.
Action, supra note 1, at 14; ColOpy,SUprll note 1, at 159.
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required a plaintiff to prove only that a recipient's actions caused
disparate impacts. 6o Only justices Marshall and White explicitly stated
that Bakke had not overruled LaU. 61
Despite Guardians' limitation of section 601 to intentional discrimination, five members of the Court indicated that section 602 of Title VI
permits federal agencies to promulgate regulations that prohibit
disparate impact discrimination. 62 justice Stevens's dissenting opinion,
joined by justices Brennan and Blackmun, argued that intentional
discrimination is a necessary element under section 601 of Title VI, but
that regulations under section 602 may incorporate a disparate impact
standard: "[A]lthough the petitioners had to prove that the respondents'
actions were motivated by an invidious intent in order to prove a
violation of [Title VI], they only had to show that the respondents'
actions were producing discriminatory effects in order to prove a
violation of [the regulations].,,63 justice Stevens maintained that the
disparate impact Title VI regulations at issue in the case were valid
because the Court had upheld similar regulations in Lau and other cases,
that the regulations had the "force oflaw" because they were reasonably
related to the purposes of the statute, and that valid agency regulations
having the force of law could be enforced under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 64
While it is not clear whether his dissenting opinion in Guardians would
have allowed a private right of action to enforce section 602's regulations,65 pursuant to section 1983,justice Stevens would have awarded

60. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589-93 (White,].); id. at 615,623 (Marshall,]., dissenting);
Mank, Primle Cause '!fAction, supra note 1, at 14, 33; Mello,supra note 2, at 965.
61. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 590-91 n.11 (opinion ofWhite,].)(arguinltJakkeaddrcssed only intentional
discrimination and that Title VI may prohibit effects discrimination);id. at 624 (Marshall,]., dissenting)
(arguing Bakke's statement that Title VI was "'coextensive'" with the Equal Protection Clause was "clearly
superfluous to the decision in that case"); Mello,supra note 2, at 965.
62. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 591-95 (White,]., delivering judgment of the COUlt) ("The
threshold issue before the Court is whether the pli\'ate plaintiffs in this case need to prove discliminatory
intent to establish a \'iolation of Title VI ... and administrative implementing regulations promulgated
thereunder. I conclude, as do four other Justices, in separate opinions, the Court of Appeals erred in
requilingproof of discriminatory intent.");id. at 635-39,642-45 (Stevens,].,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,
.D.); id at 623,625-26,634 (Marshall,].); Mank,Prillale Cause '!fAction, supra note 1, at 14,33-34; Mello,supra
note 2, at 965-68; Colopy,supra note 1, at 159.
63. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, Brennan & Blackmun,.D., dissenting); Mank,Pnilale Cause
'!fAction, supra note 1, at 14-15,34.
64. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 642-45 (Stevens, Brennan, and Blackmun,.D., dissenting); Bradford
Mank, UsingSection 1983 To Eriforce 7itk VI's § 602 Regulatioll.f 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 321,341 (2001) (discussing
Justice Stevens argument that Title VI's disparate impacn'Cgulations are enforceable through 42 U .S.C. §
1983); Mello, supra note 2, at 965, 967-68 (same).
65. In his dissenting opinion inSandolla/l'. Alexander,Justice Stevens claimed that he believed at the time
of his Guardians' dissent that there was a plivate light of action under Title VI's disparate impact regulations:
"I thought then, as Ido now, that a violation of regulations adopted pursuant to Title VI may be established
by proof of discriminatory impact in a § 1983 action against state actors and also in an implied action against
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the plaintiffs' compensation, including damages, for disparate impact
discrimination prohibited by section 602's valid implementing regulations. 66
Justices White and Marshall each would have allowed disparate
impact suits under either sections 601 or 602.67 While his opinion
primarily focused on his argument that the plaintiffs should be able to
bring a discriminatory impact action through section 601,68 JustiCe
White also maintained that the Department of Labor's section 602
disparate impact regulations were valid, stating that he "believe[s] that
the regulations are valid, even assuming arguendo that Tide VI, in and
of itself, does not proscribe disparate-impact discrimination."69 Even if
he were "wrong in concluding Bakke did not overrule lAu"70 concerning
whether section 601 prohibited disparate impact discrimination,Justice
White correcdy observed that Bakke had never addressed whether Tide
VI would nevertheless allow agencies to promulgate disPflrate impact
discrimination regulations. 71 Justice White argUed thatJustice Stewart's
lAu concurrence had appropriately concluded that the term "discrimination" in Tide VI is ambiguous, and that agencies at least had the
discretion to issue regulations barring disparate impact discrimination
by recipients. 72
Justice Marshall argued in his Guardians dissent that Bakke's limitation
of Tide VI to cases involving discriminatory intent did not preclude the
Court from giving deference to the "long-standing" interpretation of
every cabinet department and about forty federal agencies since 1964
that they had the authority to issue disparate impact discrimination
regulations. 73 Additionally, he observed that Congress was aware of
these regulations, but had rejected several proposals to require proof of
intentional discrimination. 74 Even if the Court would not have reached

prh,ate parties." 523 U.S. 275, 301 n.6 (Stevens,]., dissenting). However,justice Scalia in his Sando\'al
m<tiorityopinion quoted a sentence fromjustice Ste\'cns'l(dlardiansdissent implying that relief for violations
of the regulation was available only undcr § I 983.fd. at 284 n.3. justice Stevens contendcd that the majority
had "misread [ ]" the meaning of that sentence.ld. at 301 n.6. Despite this controversy, it is faino say that
justice Stevens's Guardians dissent never explicitly stated that there was a private light of action' under Title
VI's disparate impact regulations.
66. Guardians 463 U.S. at 645 (Ste\'ens, Brenn"n & Blackmun,jJ., dissenting).
67. /d. at 584 & n.2, 589·93 (White,].); id. at 615,623 (Mal'Shall,j., dissenting); Mank,ltim/e Cause
0/Action, supra note I, at 15, 33·34.
68. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584, 589·93 (White,]., deliveringjudgmennf the Court); Mank, JTiva/e
Cause ~fAction, supra note I, at 15,33.
69. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2 (White,]., delivelingjudgment of the Court).
70. /d. at 591 (White,]., deli\'eringjudgment of the COUlt).
71. /d. at 592 (White,]., deliveringjudgment of the Court).
72. /d.
73. ld. at 615, 617-20 (Mal'Shall,]., dissenting).
74. /d.
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the same interpretation had the issue first arisen before it, Justice
Marshall argued, "A contemporaneous and consistent construction of
a statute by those charged with its enforcement combined with
congressional acquiescence "'creat~s a presumption in favor of the
administrative interpretation, to which we should give great weight, even
ifwe doubted the correctness ojthe ruling ojthe Department . ... ",75 Accordingly,
five members of the Guardians Court recognized the validity of disparate
impact regulations under section 602. of Title V1 76

D. Alexander v. Choate
During 1985, in Alexander v. Choate,77 the Supreme Court examined
whether evidence of disparate impact was sufficient to establish a prima
facie case under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. 78
Because section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act was bC\sed on Title VI and
has nearly identical language, the Alexander Court carefully reviewed its
Title VI decisions. 79 The Alexander decision acknowledged tha,t "Title VI
itself directly reach[es] only instances ofintentional discrimination.,,8o
Nevertheless, Alexander unanimously interpreted Guardians to permit
agencies to promulgate Title VI regulations that prohibit disparate
impact discrimination: "The [Guardians] Court held that actions having
an unjustifiable, disparate impact on minorities could be redressed
through agency regulations designed to implement the purposes of Title
VI. ,,01 Furthermore, the Alexander Court suggested that Guardians should
be interpreted to establish an implied private right ofaction for disparate
impact under Title VI's implementing regulations:
Guardians, therefore, does not support petitioners' blanket proposition
that federal law proscribes only intentional discrimination against the
handicapped. Indeed, to the extent our holding in Guardians is

75. /d. at 615, 621 (MarshaIlJ., dissenting)(quoting Costanzo \". Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341,345 (1932)
(emphasis added by Justice Marshall)).
76. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 & n.2, 589·93 (White,]., deli\"elingjudgment of the CourtNJ. at 635·
45 (Ste\'ens,].,joined by Brennan & Blackmun,jJ.); id at 615, 623.26, 634 (Marshall,].); Chester Residents
Concemedfor Quality Living\". Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 930 (3d Cir. I 997}j1acaledas moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998).
77. 469 U.S. 287 (1985).
78. Id. at 292·99 (concluding that the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000), authorizes
disparate impact discrimination clairns in some circumstances).
79. Ale.wuuier, 469 U.S. at 295 n.IJ(explaining that section 504 was OIiginally proposed as an
amendmentto Title VI); see also U.S. Dep'tofTransp. \". Paralyzed Vetemns of Am., 477 U.S. 597,600
(1986) (scction 504 and its regulations were modeled after Title VI); Colopy, supra note I, at 156·57 n.140.
But see Consol. Rail Corp. \'. Darrone,' 465 U.S. 624, 632·33 n.13 (1984) (recognizing differences between
Title VI and Section 504).
80. 469 U.S. at 293.
81. /d. at 293 (citing Guardians, 463 U.S. 582).
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relevant to the interpretation of § 504, Guardians suggests that the
regulations implementing § 504, upon which respondents in part rely,
could make actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case.82

E. Alexander v. Sandoval: Justice Stevens's Dissent
As discussed in the Introduction,Justice Scalia's majority opinion in
Sandoval questioned the validity of Title VI's disparate impact regulations because Bakke and Guardians had stated that section 601 forbids
only intentional discrimination. 83 In his dissenting opinion in Sandoval,
Justice Stevens,joined byJustices Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg, argued
that Title VI's disparate impact regulations are valid despite section
601 's more limited scope. He agreed withJustice Stewart's concurrence
in Lau that section 602 regulations may go beyond section 601 if they
reasonably effectuate the latter section's anti-discrimination purposes. 84
He argued that the statute's text and legislative history demonstrated
that Congress intended to give agencies the discretion to prohibit less
overt forms of discrimination, including both unintentional discrimination and intentional discrimination that might be impossible to prove
except through inference. 85
1. Title VI's Legislative History Strongly Suggests that Congress
Delegated to Administrative Agencies and the President the
Issue of Whether the Section 602 Regulations Would
Prohibit Intentional or Disparate Impact Discrimination

In a 1981 article, Professor Charles Abernathy carefully reviewed
Title VI's legislative history and concluded that Congress deliberately
avoided the difficult issue of whether the statute required proof of
intentional or effects discrimination. Instead, Congress delegated the
issue of defining discrimination to the agency in charge ofimplementing
each program, subject to section 602's requirement that the President
approve them and that the regulations must be "consistent" with the
statute. 86 Citing Professor Abernathy's article, Justice Marshall

82. Id. at 294 (footnote omitted).
83. Alexander \'. Sandoval, 523 U.S. 275, 282 (200 I); supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
84. /d. at 1529-30 (Stevens,]., dissenting).
85. /d.
86. The President must approve any regulations andthey must be "consistent with achie\'ement of
the objecti\'es of the statute authorizing the financial assistance."Su 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000); Guardians,
463 U.S. at 623 n.14 (Marshall,]., dissenting); Mello,rupra note 2, at955 n. 103,971. In 1980, President
Carter delegated that authority to the Attorney General and the DepaltmentofJustice has issued regulations
to insure relati\'e1y uniform enforcement of the statute.See§ 1-101 Exec. Order No. 12,250 (No\'. 2, 1980);
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contended in his Guardians dissent, "The legislative history of Title VI
fully confirms that Congress intended to delegate to the Executive
Branch substantial leeway in interpreting the meaning of discrimination
under Title VI."87 Justice Marshall observed that Congress had not
defined the term "discrimination" in the statute,88 and argued that this
congressional choice was deliberate as a means to give executive
departments and agencies the freedom to define its meaning in
accordance with their particular department or agency.89 He quoted
then Attorney General Robert Kennedy's testimony to the House
Judiciary Committee that Congress give agencies such discretion as long
as they used section 601 "as a general criterion to follow."90 The
Alexander Court appeared to accept Justice Marshall and Professor
Abernathy's interpretation of Title VI's legislative history when it
observed that Congress had "delegated to the agencies in the first
instance the complex determination of what sorts of disparate impacts
upon minorities constituted significant social problems, and were readily
enough remedial, to warrant altering the practices of the federal
grantees that had produced those impacts.,,91
There are strong reasons to accept Professor Abernathy and Justice
Marshall's interpretation of Title VI's legislative history as granting
substantial deference to agencies in defining the term "discrimination."
Most importantly, in 1964, shortly after the statute was enacted, a
presidential task force developed disparate impact regulations for HEW,
and then used these regulations as a model in drafting regulations for
twenty-one additional agencies or commissions that all prohibited
disparate impact discrimination. 92 President Johnson approved the
regulations and published them in the Federal Register. 93 In Guardians,
Justice Marshall properly observed that Title VI's disparate impact

45 Fed. Reg. 72795 (1980) (delegating presidential authority to the Attorney General for approving Title VI
regulations and reviewing agency's enforcement); Colopy,rupra note I, at 172 n.221; see generally 28 C.F.R.
§§ 42.401-42.415 (2002) (DepartmentofJustice regulations providing coordination of Title VI enforcement).
87. Guardinns, 463 U.S. at 615, 622-23 (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citing AbernathYfUpra note 2, at 2039).
88. /d. at615, 622 n.12 (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citing 110 Congo Rec. 5612 (1964) (Sen. Elvin)jd.
at 1619 (Rep. Abernathy); Uf. at 1632 (Rep. Dowdy); Uf. at 5251 (Sen. Talmadge); Uf. at 6052 (Sen.
Sparkman)).
89. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 614, 622-23.
90. /d. at 615, 623 (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citing Civil Rights: Hearings on H.R. 7152 Before the
House Comm. on theJudicialY, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 2740 (1963) (testimony of Attorney General Kennedy)).
91. Alexander \'. Sandoval, 523 U.S. 275, 293-94 (2001).
92. Guardians463 U.S. at 618 (Marshall,]., dissenting) (citing regulations in 29 Fed. Reg. 16274-16305
(1964); 45 C.F.R. § 80.3(b)(2) (1964)); Watson,rupra note 8, at 947-48; Comment,supra note 8, at 846.
93. Comment, supra note 8, at 846 n.26 (citing 31 Fed. Reg. 10265-68 (1966), 30 Fed. Reg. 298-329
(1965),29 Fed. Reg. 16274-309, 19277-89, 19291-95, 19297-304 (1964)), n.2~citing Title VI regulations
for twenty-two agencies and commissions).
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regulations were entitled to substantial deference because they represent
"a contemporaneous construction of a statute by those charged with
setting the law in motion . . . .,,94 Furthermore, under the Chevron
doctrine, the Supreme Court defers to an agency's reasonable
construction of an ambiguous statute,93 and, as Professor Abernathy
demonstrates, the text and legislative history of Title VI are at least
ambiguous about whether Congress intended to define the term
"discrimination" as including intentional acts only or including actions
having a disparate impact. 96
Unfortunately, Justice Scalia is likely to dismiss Justice Marshall and
Professor Abernathy's interpretation of Title VI's legislative history as
irrelevant because, as a proponent of "textualist" interpretation, he
routinely refuses to consider a statute's legislative history.97 Justice
Scalia has argued that courts should refuse to consider a statute's
legislative history because it is the text alone that is enacted by Congress
and presented to the President for his signature or veto. 98 For Justice
Scalia, and probably Justice Thomas as well, who has usually agreed
with the textualist approach,99 the fact that the text of section 602 does
not explicitly authorize disparate impact regulations is likely decisive

94. Guardians, 463 U.S. at 618 (Marshall,]., dissenting).
95. Che\"l"On U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Der. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,843 (1984) (stating courts
should defer to agency's "permissible" construction of an ambiguous statute).
96. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
97. A,\"TO:\"I:X SCAUA,AMAlTEROFi'\"TERI'RETATIO:X 29-37 (1997) (arguing that ajudge should
not use legislath'e histOlY as a guide to statutOlY meaning because only statute's text provides meaning
adopted by whole Congress; legislati\'e histOlY often renects only minOlity of Congress); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., ThXew Textualism, 37 UCLA L. RE\". 621 (1990) (criticizingJustice Scalia's refusal to consider legislati\'e
histOlY) [hercinafter Eskridge, New Te.~tualism]; Gregory E. Maggs, Reconciling Te.~tualism and the Chevron
Doctrine: In Difense cifJusticeScalia, 28 CO:X:-:. L. REv. 393, 397-98 (1996) (defendingJustice Scalia's refusal
to consider legislative histOlY).
98. W. Va. Uni\·. Hosps.,Inc. \'. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,98-99 (1991); Thompson v. Thompson, 484
U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia,]., concurring); John F. Manning,Te.\·tualism and the Equi!Y cifthe Statute, 101
COLDL L. REv. 1,70-77 (2001) (discussing textualist theOlY that judges must base statutory interpretation
on statute's text because only text is presented to President for signature or veto) [hereinafteiTe.\·tualism and
the EquiIJ cifthe Statute]; Bradford C. Mank, Is a Te.\·tualistApproach to Statutory Interpretation Pro-Enllironmentalist?:
rt'hy PragmaticAgenry Decisionmaking is Better ThanJudicialliteralisr953 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1237 n.26
(1996) [hereinafter Mank, Te.~tualist}; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislntit>e History and the Interpretation cif StatufM:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model cifStatutory Interpretatiotj 76 VA. L. REv. 1295,1300-01 (1990); (same); if. INS \'.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925-32 (1983) (finding one-house legislath'e \'eto \'iolates requirements of
bicamcralism and presentment set forth in Article I).
99. Bank Am. Trust & Sav Ass'n v. 203 N. L.'lsalle St. P'ship, 526 U.S. 434, 460-62 (Thomas,].,
joined by Scalia]., concurring in judgment); Conn. Nat'l Bank \'. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,253-54 (1992)
(Thomas,].) ("We ha\'e stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute
what it means and means in a statute what it says there .... When the words ofa statute are unambiguous,
then, this first canon is also the last: 1udicial inquiry is complete.'" (quoting Rubin \'. United States, 449 U.S.
424,430 (1981)); John F. Manning, ThXon-Delegation Doctrine as a Canon cifAl'oidanc~ 2000 St;I'. CT. REv.
223,226 n.22 [hereinafterNlanning, Non-Delegation Doctri~ (statingJustices Scalia and Thomas consistently
use tcxtualist appwach).

2002]

TITLE VI'S DISPARATE IMPACT REGULATIONS

531

evidence that agencies lack the authority to issue such regulations,
especially in light of the Court's interpretation that section 601 is limited
to intentional discrimination. 100 Accordingly,Justice Scalia and Justice
Thomas are likely to ignore the persuasive evidence in the statute's
legislative history that Congress intended to delegate to administrative
agencies the choice to adopt disparate impact regulations as long as they
are "consistent" with the statute and the President approves them. lol
Many scholars and judges have criticized Justice Scalia and other
textualists, however, for refusing to consider the important information
about congressional intent and purpose that is often found only in a
statute's legislative history.l02 Most importantly, a majority of the
Supreme Court continues to evaluate legislative history. 103 Accordingly,
the Court may still weigh the persuasive evidence in Title VI's legislative
history that Congress gave federal agencies the discretion to decide
whether to adopt disparate impact regulations.
Furthermore, ifit invalidates Title VI's disparate impact regulations,
the Supreme Court will be acting contrary to the settled expectations of
most members of Congress since 1964. While courts are reluctant to
conclude that legislative inaction alone is sufficient to approve an
agency's interpretation of a statute,104 it is significant that since 1964
Congress has never repealed Title VI's widely adopted disparate impact
regulations. Additionally, there is considerable evidence that many
members of subsequent Congresses assumed that Title VI's disparate
impact regulations are valid. Most notably, in the legislative history of
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,105 which amended Title VI to
provide that the statute's anti-discrimination provisions applied on an
"institution-wide application,,106 to include "all of the operations,,107 of

100. Alexander v. Sandoval, 523 U.S. 275, 286 (200 1); .rupra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 200Od-1 (2000); Mello, .rupra note 2, at 955 n.103, 971; .rupra notes 86-96 and
accompanying text.
102. Mank, Te.dua/ist, .rupra note 98, at 1240; AbnerJ. Mikva,A ReplY to Judge SIa7T's Obstn'atio'4 1987
DUKE LJ. 380,385-86; Patricia M. Wald, The Sia:.ling Skeper: The Use I!fLegi.slatillt History in Construing StaJutes
in the 1988-89 Term I!fthe UniJed Stales Supreme Court 39A.\1. U. L. REv. 277,306-08 (1990).
103. Lawrence M. Solan, 'Leaming Our LimiJs: The Decline I!fTe.~tualism in Statutory Cam; 1997 Wis. L.
REv. 235, 263-64, 283 (stating majority ofjustices on Supreme COUlt still consider legislative history).
104. United States ,'. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517,535-36 (1998) (Scalia,J., concurring in part and
concuninginjudgment) (arguing Congress cannot express its will by failure to legislate); Esklid~pra note
95, at 246-50 (observing that many scholars are skeptical of attributing significance to the failure of Congress
to legislate, but arguing that legislative inaction can be significant in some cases); William W. Buzbee;1he
One-CongressFiction in StaJutory InterpretatUm, 149 U.PA. L. REv. 171,240 (2000) (stating textualists are generally
reluctant to draw inferences from legislative inaction, failure or silence).
105. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-4a) (ovenuling Grove City Coli. v. Bell, 465 U.I). 555 (1984)).
106. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, § 2(2) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A)).
107. /d. at § 6 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 200Od-4a).
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a defendant, there is evidence that both Republican and Democratic
members of Congress assumed that Title VI's disparate impact
regulations are valid and can be enforced through an implied right of
action. 108
The Supreme Court has generally been reluctant, however, to
consider post-enactment legislative history. 109 For instance, the
Supreme Court in Public Employees Retirement System qf Ohio v. Betts
declared that "[w]e have observed on more than one occasion that the
interpretation given by one Congress (or a committee or Member
thereoD to an earlier statute is of little assistance in discerning the
meaning of that statute." I 10 Yet, a stronger argument for affirming Title
VI's disparate impact regulations than legislative inaction or subsequent
legislative history can be found in subsequent statutes in which Congress
expressly adopted these regulations as a model.

III. IN SUBSEQUENT STATUTES, CONGRESS HAS RATIFIED SECTION
602's DISPARATE IMPACT REGULATIONS
Congress has never explicitly ratified Title VI's disparate impact
regulations when amending the statute itself. Several different
Congresses, however, have explicitly endorsed the Title VI disparate
impact regulations by requiring their adoption by different agencies
when they enforce related anti-discrimination statutes governing specific
government assistance programs. I I I For example, a statute enacted first

108. See, e.g., H.R. REp. NO. 963, at 24 (1986) (obsel"ing that private right of action exists under both
Title IX and its regulations); 134 Q)XG REC. 4,257 (1988) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (predicting advocacy
groups will file Title VI disparate impact suits in federal court);see also id. at 99-100 (1988) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (discussing enforcement of disparate impact suits by prhate parties); 130 O:\'G REC. 18,879-80
(1 984)(statement of Rep. Field) (consideringGuardiansand contending that "a State [will] be subject to private
lawsuits because the tests have a disproportionate impact on minorities");see Alexander v. SandO\'al, 532
U.S. 275, 302 n.9 (Stevens,]., dissenting) (arguing legislative history of 1986 and 1987 amendments to Title
V demonstrate that many members of Congress were aware that courts had implied private rights of action
undersection 602 disparate impact regulations); Chester Residents Concerned for Quality Living". Seif, 132
F.2d 925,934-35 & n.13 (3d Cir. 1997) (concluding that legislative histOl"Y of Civil Rights Restoration Act
of 1987 provided "some indication" that Congress intended to allow pI;vate right of action under section 602
of Title VI to enforce disparate impact regulations)/'acatedt!S moot, 524 U.S. 974 (1998); Mank,Pni'ate Cause
I!!Action,supranote 1, at 40-43 (discussing Chester's use oflegis1ative history in <n'ILRlGHTSREsTORATI01'
ACT OF 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988)).
109. Mackey v. LanierCollections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 838-40 (1988) (stating subsequent
legislative histOlY is oflimited "alue because intent of Congress that enacted statute is controlling); Eskridge,
supra note 95, at 221-22 (indicating that subsequent legislative history was considered least authOl;tative type
of legislative histOlY by Supreme Court in early 1980s, but that Burger Court considered such evidence on
a number of occasions); Mank,lnmte Cause I!!Action, supra note 1, at 45 (arguing in recent years that Supreme
Court is less likely to consider post-enactment legislative histOlY).
110. 492 U.S. 158, 168(1989).
Ill. See Luke Cole, Center on Race PO\'elty & the Environment, Olga Pomar, Camden Regional
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by the 97th Congress in 1982 and then amended by the 103rd Congress
in 1994 directs the Secretary of Transportation "to ensure that an
individual is not excluded because of race , creed, color, national origin,
or sex from participating" in any activities funded by federal aviation
grants.
Additionally, the statute requires the Secretary of
Transportation to prescribe regulations "to carry out this section,"
which "shall be similar to those in effect under tide VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.).,,112 Similarly, the 95th
Congress, in 1978, required federal agencies to guarantee that no person
shall be excluded from participating in any activity or employment
conducted pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act or the
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 on the basis
of race, creed, color, national origin, or sex. Moreover, the statute
stated that each agency "shall promulgate such rules as it deems
necessary to carry out the purposes of this section, and any rules
promulgated under this section ... shall be similar to those established
and in effect under tide VI and tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."113 Furthermore, the 93rd Congress enacted two statutes in 1973
and 1974 prohibiting any person from being subjected to discrimination
on the basis of sex in programs receiving assistance by the Federal
Highway Administration or under the Federal Energy Administration
Act, explaining that "[t]his provision will be enforced through agency
provisions and rules similar to those already established, with respect to
racial and other discrimination, under tide VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964."114 Four other statutes contain similar provisions. I I';
The crucial question is how much weight should courts give to
congressional use of Tide VI disparate impact regulations in related
statutes. If a subsequent statute or amendment to a statute clearly
endorses a particular judicial or administrative interpretation of a

Legal Services, Inc.,Jerome Balter & Michael Churchill, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, On
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States COUIt of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Supreme Court
of the United States, S. Camden Citizens in Action \'. NJ. Dept. of En\'tl. Prot., 70 USLW 3669, 01-1547,
at 17-18 (April 15, 2002),cm. dmied, 70 USLW 3669 Gune 24, 2002).
112. 49U.S.C.§47123 (2000).
113. 43 U.S. C. § 1863.
114. 23 U.S.C. § 324 and 15 U.S.C. § 775.
115. See 15 U.S.C. § 719 (requiting promulgation of anti-discrimination rules similar to Title VI for
Alaska Natural Gas Transportation); 40 U.S.C. § 476 (prohibiting sex discrimination in connection with
managementand disposal offederal pl'Opetty and requiring promulgation of ant i-disc rim ination rules similar
to Title VI); 42 U.S.C. § 5891 (pl'Ohibiting sex disctimination in connection with development of energy
sources and requiring pl'Omulgation of anti-disctimination rules similar to Title VI); 42 U.S.C. § 6709
(prohibitingsex discrimination in connection with public works employment and requiting promulgation of
anti-discrimination rules similar to Title VI).
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statute, then courts will recognize that interpretation as binding. IIG
Accordingly, if Congress had re-enacted Title VI and explicitly
endorsed section 602's disparate impact regulations, then it would be
clear that the regulations are valid. A more difficult case is if Congress
had amended Title VI in a way that implicitly approved the disparate
impact regulations. In that example, a court would need to carefully
analyze hbw such an amendment affects the meaning of the prior
statute. 1I7 For example, because 1986 amendments to Title IX
explicitly waived state's sovereign immunity to remedies both at law and
equity,Justice Scalia conceded that this subsequent legislation validated
judicial decisions establishing a private right of action under Title IX. 118
If Congress had simply re-enacted Title VI and had not explicitly
referred to the disparate impact regulations adopted by virtually every
agency, there are a number of cases that have held that Congress would
be deemed to have adopted an agency's interpretation of a statute when,
knowing of an agency's interpretation, the legislature re-enacts the
statute without significant change. I 19 Similarly, the re-enactment of a
statute which has been given a consistent judicial interpretation
generally includes the settled judicial interpretation even though that
interpretation is never explicitly mentioned ifit is reasonable to assume
that Congress was aware of that interpretation. 120 The fact that

116. FDA v. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 133, 143 (2000) (stating more specific subsequent
statute controls over more genel1l1, em'liel' statute) (citing United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 317,
330-331 (1998); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988));seegeneral[y Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti,
Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-Syslon Valutf 21 SETO:'i HALL LEGIS.]. 233, 287 n.149
(1997) (stating that even interpreters who focus on original meaning of statute acknowledge specific
amendment may change interpretation of statute).
117. See Bl1ldley C. Karkkainen, "PlainMeaning": JusticeScalill'sJurisprudence'!fStrictSltttutmy Constructio9
17 HAR\·.].L. & Pt.:B. PoL'y 401, 409 (1994) (discussing Pennsyh'ania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1,29
(1989) (Scalia,]., concuning in part and dissenting in pall) (arguing that provisions of the Comprehensi,oe
Emoironmental Response, Compens.~tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) and Supelfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA) must be read in combination to hold statdiable for damages in prinlle suits
over hazardous waste sites)).
118. RehabilitationAct Amendments of 1986, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(I), (2); Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Sch., 303 U.S. 60, 78 (1992) (Scalia,J., concuning injudgment);see also id. at 72-73 (stating
Congl'ess'S abrogation of States' sovereign Amendment immunity under Title IX in the Rehabilitation Act
Amendmentsofl986 "cannot be read except as a validation of Cannon's holding" that private right of action
is available under the statute).
.
119. FDIC v. Philadelphia Gear Corp., 476 U.S. 426, 437 (1986) (stating if Congress reenacts statute
without change it is presumed to have adopted longstanding agency interpretation of statute); Massachusetts
v. FDIC, 102 F.3d 613, 620-21 (1996) (same).
120. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 567 (1988) (declining to apply "re-enactment" rule
because of inconsistent judicial interpretation, but stating reenactment of statute with consistent judicial
interpretation"genel1llly includes the settledjudicial interpretation"); Lorillard , .. Pons, 434 U.S. 575,580-81
(1978) ("Congress is presumed to be aware of an administl1ltive orjudicial interpretation ofa statute and to
adopt that interpretation when it re-enacts a statute without change") (dictum, but widely cited case));
Esklidge, supra note 97, at 243-44, 311 (discussingLorillard and reenactment rule).
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Congress has explicitly adopted Title VI's disparate impact regulations
for several related statutes is in some ways stronger evidence than when
Congress merely re-adopts a statute without ever explicitly addressing
a judicial interpretation or an agency's interpretation of the statute or its
regulations.
Because it is often helpful to consider related statutes when
interpreting difficult or ambiguous statutory language, courts have
developed the "in pari materia" canon of considering together related or
similar statutes. 121 Justice Scalia often considers related statutes in
seeking to define a statutory text's most likely meaning. 122 For instance,
in United Savs. Ass'n v. Timbers qf Inwood Forest Associates, 123 Justice Scalia
argued that statutory interpretation is a "holistic endeavor" in which
judges should consider the meaning of terms in a number of related
statutes. 124 Similarly, in United States v. Fausto, 125 Justice Scalia stated,
"This classic judicial task of reconciling many laws enacted over time,
and getting them to 'make sense' in combination, necessarily assumes
that the implications of a statute may be altered by the implications of
a later statute." 126 On the other hand,Justice Scalia has also observed
that courts should seek the original meaning of a statute at the time
Congress enacted it instead of examining evidence about how
subsequent Congresses might have interpneted its language. 127 Perhaps

121. Buzbee, supra note 104, at 221-25 (discussing inpari materia canon, especially its use by Justice
Scalia); William N. Eskridge,Jr.,Alblu Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. RE\'. 1007, 1039 (1989)
(same); Bradford C. Mank, Textualism's Selectil'e Canons rifStatutory Construction: Reinl~gorating IndiI~dual Liberties,
LegislatiI,eAuthori!)! and Deference to Etecutil,eAgencies, 86 Ky. LJ. 527,550 (1998); Michael E. Solimine,Remol'a~
Remantisand Reforming FederalAppellaU Rez~tlq 58 Mo. L. RE\'. 287,299 (1993) (questioning irpati maUriacanon
because Congress does not always consider entire statute when amending one part of multi-part section, and
unrelated material is often placed next to each other in U.S. Code).
122. See W. Va. Hosps. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,100 (1991); Green \'. Bock l ..lUndlY Mach. Co., 490
U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia,]., concuning) (statingjudges should interpret statutes by finding meaning "(1)
most in accord with context and ordinalY usage ... and (2) most compatibhrl'ith the surrounding body of
law into which the pro\'ision must be integrated"); Pierce \'. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564-65 (1988)
(finding meaning of term "substantially justified" in Equal Access toJustice Act based on use of "substantial"
in Administrative Procedure Act and Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Ch'il Procedure); Kungys v. United
States, 485 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1988) (finding meaning of term "material" in the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952 by examining its use in criminal statutes); Buzbee,su/lra note 104, at 221 nn.I77, 179 (stating
Justice Scalia often considers usage in other statutes); Eskridge,Jr.,7he. \-t'W Tevtualism, supra note 97, at 661
(statingJustice Scalia often considers how word or phrase is used in other statutes).
123. 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
124. Id. at 371.
125. 484 U.S. 439 (1988).
126. Id. at 453 (Scalia,].) (stating Ch'il Sen'ice Reform Act precludesjudicialre\'iew of disciplinalY
measures against particular federal employees, e\'en though provisions of Back Pay Act are to the contnIlY);
Karkkainen, supra note 117, at 409.
127. Cas,!)!, 499 U.S. at 101 n.7 ("The 'will of Congress' we look to is not a will evoh'ing from Session
to Session, but a will expressed and fixed in a particular enactment."); Vt'LUA~I D. PQPKIX, STATCTES IX
COCRT: THE HISTORY A:\l) THEORY OF STATCTORY IXTERPRETATIOX 179-80 (1999) (noting that
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the apparently contradictory approaches suggested byJustice Scalia can
be reconciled if he means that a judge should first seek to find a
unambiguous meaning in the original statute, but should look to related
statutes if the original statute does not have a clear meaning. '2B
There is often controversy about when and to what extent judges
should consider related statutes in interpreting a statute. 129 In particular,
some commentators have criticized Justice Scalia for making interstatutory textual comparisons, but refusing to consider whether a
comparison is appropriate in light of their legislative history, historical
content, or surrounding judicial decisions. 130 Whether it is appropriate
to compare statutory provisions in different statutes depends on how
closely related they are to each other. '31 Additionally, it depends on
whether Congress intended courts to interpret them in conjunction. 132
Because Congress does not always explicitly address whether it intends
one statute to be interpreted in light of another, judges must determine
whether it is appropriate to assume that Congress is seeking to create a
coherent body of law among several statutes. 133 Before undertaking
interstatutory comparisons, courts should examine the statutes' historical
context, legislative intent, legislative histories, administrative
developments, and relevant judicial precedents to determine if the
statutes are sufficiently related to use one statute to define meaning in
another. 134
In some recent cases, the Supreme Court has considered subsequent
related statutes when interpreting an earlier statute. In Food & Drug

textualists generally focus on original meaning of statute, but contending judges should consider modern
understandings if they involve issues that original Congress did not anticipate).
128. Casry, 499 U.S. at 100 ("Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous,
we construe it to contain that pelmissible meaning which fits most logically and comfortably into the body
of both pre,·iously and subsequently enacted law.");i1!fra note 145 and accompanying text.
129. See Sorenson , .. Sec'y of the Treasury, 475 U.S. 851,867 (1986) (Ste,·ens,]., dissenting) (arguing
m<\iority'scomparison of two different prO\·isions codified in the same statute, but enacted at different times,
was inappropliate); UnitedStates v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 444 (1943) (Frankfurter,]., dissenting) (arguing
m<\iority inappropliately compared different statutes where there was no indication Congress intended
comparison); Buzbee,supra note 104, at 223-25 (discussing danger of overusing in pari mateda doctrine).
130. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 104, at 184-88, 190-93, 225, 248-49 (criticizing Supreme Court and
especiallyJustice Scalia's use ofstatutOlY comparisons without adequate consideration of historical context,
Iegislati,·e histOlY or judicial precedents).
131. See id. at237 (arguing interstatutory references are "prone tojudicial abuse" if there are no limits
on which statutes may be cross-referenced).
132. See Popkin,supra note 127, at 1149-50 (criticizingJustice Scalia's assumption that statutes can be
compared in the absence of any historical evidence Congress intended such a comparison).
133. See generallY Manning,Non-Delegation Doctrine, supra note 99, at 234 (discussing Supreme Court's
assumption of "coherence among statutes" inFDA II. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120 (2000)).
134. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 237-39, 242-49 (arguing courts should examine a ,·ariety of
information about relationship between allegedly related statutes before making comparisons).
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Administration v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,t35 the Court
interpreted a 1938 statute, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA), 136 as being limited by several statutes enacted beginning in
1965 to regulate tobacco advertising even though the latter statutes did
not explicitly refer to the 1938 statute. 137 The Court stated that the
meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts, especially in
circumstances in which a subsequent statute is more specific than a more
general prior statute. 138 Justice O'Connor stated as a general principle
that "the meaning of one statute may be affected by other Acts,
particularly where Congress has spoken subsequently and more
specifically to the topic at hand."139 In particular, Justice O'Connor
concluded:
In determining whether Congress has spoken directly to the FDA's
authority to regulate tobacco, we must also consider in greater detail
the tobacco-specific legislation that Congress has enacted over the
past 35 years. At the time a statute is enacted, it may have a range of
plausible meanings. Over time, however, subsequent acts can shape
or focus those meanings. The "classic judicial task of reconciling
many laws enacted over time, and getting them to 'make sense' in
combination, necessarily assumes that the implications of a statute
may be altered by the implications of a later statute." United States v.
Fausto, 484 U.S., at 453, 108 S.Ct. 668. This is particularly so where
the scope of the earlier statute is broad but the subsequent statutes
more specifically address the topic at hand. As we recognized recently
in United States v. Estate ofRomani, "a specific policy embodied in a later
federal statute should control our construction of the [earlier] statute,
even though it ha[s] not been expressly amended." 523 U.S., at
530-531,118 S.Ct. 1478. 140

Justice Breyer,joined byJustices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg, wrote
a vigorous dissent criticizing the majority's use of subsequent statutes as
a basis of interpretation because the later statutes did not purport to
control or change the meaning of the earlier statute. 141

135. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
136. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360j(e), 393(b)(2).
137. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 137-39, 143-56 (discussing six post-1964 statutes); Buzbequpra
note 104, at 194-200,219 (questioning Supreme Court's reliance on subsequent legislati\'e de\'e!opments in
Brown & Wzlliamso~.
138. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133 (citing United States \'. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517,53031 (1998); United States \'. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 453 (1988)).
139. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 133, 143 (citingRomani, 523 U.S. at 530-31; Fausto, 484 U.S.
at 453).
140. See Brown & Wzlliamson, 529 U.S. at 143.
141. See Uf. at 181-82 (Breyer,J., dissenting).
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It may seem surprising thatJ ustices Scalia and Thomas, who are both
avowed textualists, would join the majority opinion in Brown &
Williamson in light of its extensive use of subsequent statutes, including
their legislative history, and the majority's refusal to rely on the text of
the 1938 statute. 142 Yet the Court's opinion is consistent with Justice
Scalia's approach to statutory interpretation that judges should consider
related statutes and assume that Congress seeks to enact a coherent body
of law. 143 In West Virginia Hospitals u. Casry, 144 Justice Scalia argued,
"Where a statutory term presented to us for the first time is ambiguous,
we construe it to contain that permissible meaning which fits most
logically and comfortably into the body of both previously and
subsequently enacted law.,,143 While he did not write a separate
concurrence explaining his vote, Justice Scalia may have joined the
Court's decision in Brown & Williamson because he thought that the 1938
statute was ambiguous. Similarly, in Gustafion u. Alloyd Co., Inc., 146Justice
Thomas's dissenting opinion argued that judges should look at
neighboring words "only in cases of ambiguity." 147 Again, while it is
impossible to know Justice Thomas's specific views in Brown &
Williamson because he did not write a separate opinion, perhaps he
thought the 1938 statute at issue was ambiguous and that the Court's
understanding would be helped by examining subsequent statutes.
The unusual facts in Brown & Williamson may have led the Court to
rely so heavily on subsequent related statutes and it is possible that the
Court would be reluctant in other cases to emphasize subsequent
legislative actions to such a great extent. 148 Yet, similarly, in Amoco
Production Co. u. Southern Ute Indian Tribe, 149 Justice Kennedy interpreted
two statutes governing reservations of coal interests in light of
subsequent statutory developments and concluded that the "limited
nature of 1909 and 1910 Act reservations is confirmed by subsequent
congressional enactments." 150 Applying Brown & Williamson's approach

142. See Buzbee, supra note 104, at 194-200 (cliticizingBrown & Williamson's use of subsequent
legislative histOlY); Manning,.'\on-Dtlegalion Doctrine, supra nOle 99, at 226-28 (obselYing thatBrown &
Williamson's use of subsequent legislative histOlY is "puzzling" in light of Supreme Court's increasingly
textualist approach to interpretation ). But see i1!fra notes 143-47 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text; uyra note 145 and accompanying text.
144. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
145. /d. at 100.
146. 513 U.S. 561 (1995).
147. /d. at 586 (Thomas,]., dissenting); Popkin,supra note 98, at 182-83 & n.74 (arguing Justice
Thomas looks at related statutes 01' related words in sa/he statute only if text at issue is ambiguous).
148. See Manning,.'\iln-Dtlegation Doctrine, supra note 99, at 226-27 (arguing thatBrown & Willillmson's
use of subsequent legislative histOlY probably resulted from unstated nondelcgation concerns).
149. 526 U.S. 865 (1999).
150. /d. at 877-78; Buzbee,supra note 104, at 202.
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of considering the impact of subsequent related statutes, there is a strong
argument that the four statutes adopting Title VI's disparate impact
regulations validate those regulations under Title VI itself.
CONCLUSION

In light ofJustice Scalia's critical dicta in Sandoval, the Supreme Court
is likely to address the validity of Title VI's disparate impact regulations
in the near future. In South Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersry
Department qf Environmental Protection, 1:;1 the Third Circuit, in a 2-1
decision, used dicta in Sandoval to conclude that Title VI only prohibits
intentional discrimination, that the· EPA's Title VI regulations cannot
. be enforced through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because the disparate impact
regulations create greater rights than are established in statute, and held
that the plaintiffs cannot use § 1983 to enforce Title VI's disparate
impact regulations. 132 The plaintiff-appellants sought a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court, but the Court denied the petition onJune 24,
Q002.153 While the Court followed its usual practice in not explaining
why it denied a writ of certiorari in South Camden, onJune 20, 2002, the
Court in Gonzaga v. Doe '34 narrowed the grounds for filing suit through
42 U.S.C. § 1983 by establishing a rule that spending legislation that
provides federal funding to various state, local, and private recipients
does not ordinarily create enforceable rights under § 1983 unless
Congress demonstrates through clear and unambiguous statutory
language that it intends to provide individual rights against any recipient
that accepts federal funding. Although not directly on point, Gonzaga's
restrictive textualist approach to § 1983 suits is generally consistent with
the Third Circuit's refusal to allow plaintiffs to enforce Title VI
disparate impact regulations ~rough § 1983 because the statute does not
explicitly authorize a prohibition against disparate impact
discrimination. Mter Gonzaga, lower courts may be more reluctant to
authorize plaintiffs to enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations
through § 1983 in light of the Court's confining approach to § 1983
suits.

151. 274 F.3d 771 (3d. Cir. 2001),cerL denied, 70 USLW 3669 Gune 24, 2002).
152. Bradford C. Mank, South Camden CiI;~ in Action I'. Aiw Jersf!J Department tifE,wironmmlal Pl'Ouction:
Will Section 1983 Sm>e TrJ1e VI Disparale Impact Su;ls~ 32 E.'>;\TL. 1.. REp. 10454-79 (Em·d. L. Institute) (April
2002).
153. No. 01-1547,70 USLW 3669 (April 15,2002), celt. denied, 70 USLW 3669 Gune 24,2002);
Cole et aI., supra note III,
154. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
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Even if private plaintiffs may no longer enforce Title VI disparate
impact regulations through § 1983 or through a private right of action,
the Court still needs to consider whether federal agencies may invoke
penalties or terminate funding to recipients because of a finding of
disparate impact discrimination. 155 Every significant federal agency has
disparate impact regulations pursuant to section 602 of Title VI. 156
Eventually a recipient will appeal an adverse decision by a federal
agency using disparate impact regulations and courts will have to
address the issue. 157
Some believe that a majority of the present Court would reject Title
VI's section 602 disparate impact regulations if the Court decides to
address the issue. 158 Yet, especially in light of the four statutes that have
explicitly adopted Title VI's disparate impact regulations, there is a
strong argument that Congress has ratified the interpretation of every
federal agency to address the issue and the interpretation that the five
Justices in the Guardians majority maintained, that these regulations are
valid despite the suggestion in Bakke that the statute itself is limited to
intentional discrimination. Title VI's legislative history strongly suggests
that Congress intended to give agencies wide latitude in adopting
regulations, including regulations prohibiting disparate impact
discrimination.

155. Pursuant to section 602 of Title VI, federal agencies must investigate complaints of discrimination
and may impose sanctions if there is e\'idence of discliminatory impacts. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-l; Mank,
Private Cause '!fActwn, supra note I, at 12-13, 20-22.
156. Mank, Pm/ate Cause qfAction, supra note I, at 13; supra notes 8-9, 92-94 and accompanying text.
157. Recipients of federal funding may seek judicial review of a decision by a federal agency to
terminate or reduce funding. 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-2; Mank,PriI/a/e Cause qjAction, supra note I, at 21.
158. Actil~s/s' Appeal /0 High Court CourtM,!), Spell End/or EPA Equily Ruk~ supra note 21, at 40-41.

